Interrogation Documents Raise Questions By: S. Rowan Wolf, Ph.D., Uncommon Thought Journal

June 24, 2004

This work is under a fair use Creative Commons License

Well, I read the nine documents released by the Pentagon, and Bush's Feb. 7, 2002 order on prisoner treatment. While there are parts that are illuminating, they raise a lot of questions for me. I will attempt to give a synopsis of the released material, and place it in a context with other information - primarily the Taguba Report.

It is important to note that Bush's 2/07/02 order on treatment of prisoners was based on (at least) the following documents:

Status of Taliban and Al Qaida, Dated:19 January 2002

Status of Taliban and Al Qaida message from Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff to Unified Commands and Services, Dated: 21 January 2002

However, the Bush order references both Department of Justice and Department of Defense input in determining the status of both detainees and "enemy non-combatants" as outside the protections of the Geneva Convention. Therefore the DoJ memo that was released (8/01/02 DoJ Memo to the President's Counsel on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation) came after the order above. This means that there was 1) requests before that time on torturing detainees, and 2) that for some reason (such as wanting to extend the policy or approve even more aggressive techniques) they requested even more counsel from the DoJ. But let's deal with the documents that have been released.

Of critical importance in Bush's order is item 5 which states:

"5. I hereby reaffirm the order previously issued by the secretary of defense to the United States Armed Forces requiring that the detainees be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva."

The importance of this becomes clear when interpreting the Working Group Report of 1/15/03 (DoD Document 8). On second paragraph of page five of the pdf file (page 3 of the actual report), the 2/17/02 order is interpreted by the DoJ's General Counsel (whom I believe is William J. Haynes, II from the DoD Document 5), as approving "aggressive" "counter-resistance" techniques:

"Due to the unique nature of the war on terrorism in which the enemy covertly attacks innocent civilian populations without warning, and further due to the critical nature of the information believed to be known by certain of the Al-Qaida and Taliban detainees regarding future terrorist attacks, it may be appropriate for the appropriate approval authority to authorize as military necessity the interrogation of such unlawful combatants in a manner beyond that which may be applied to a prisoner of war who is subject to the protections of the Geneva Conventions"

Notable in Haynes report is that :

Page 72 "As the Commander in Chief authority is vested in the President, we recommend that any exercise of authority by DOD personnel be confirmed in writing through Presidential directive or other document."

The report is essentially accepted by Rumsfeld as a policy basis in his memo of 4/16/03 (DoD Document 9 which is to the Commander of US Southern Command (which I believe is Guantanamo)). In summation of that directive, Rumsfeld states: If interrogators wish to go beyond these measures "... you should provide me, via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written request describing the proposed technique, recommended safeguards, and the rationale for applying it with an identified detainee."



Questions

1) What was the Presidential directive and Pentagon policy prior to January of 2002?

2) According to the information in the memos, and the aggressive interrogations which have occurred, where are all of the written approvals, and what were the basis for those approvals? Since Rumsfeld made this "policy," he had to know what was going on.

3) What changes occurred to the policy after April 16 2003? It is clear that the policy moved beyond Guantanamo because (according to the Taguba Report) Mjr. General Miller was sent from Guantanamo to "Gitmoize" Abu Ghraib. It is also clear at this time from various reports, leaks, and human rights agencies reports, that "aggressive measures" were approved in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In fact, the according to Haynes' Working Group Report, he felt that the suggestions were legitimate in all areas outside US territory and sovereign holdings.

4) What was the Bush Directive after the Pentagon policy change. The only information we have is from before that (2/17/02). Haynes' working group report specifically requests a directive from the President in writing. The reasons for this are concerns regarding possible prosecution that might arise both domestically and internationally.

5) Bush is continuing to use the same language from item 5 of his order in press statements today. Given that it is clear how that is being interpreted, one can only assume that the President has indeed signed off on the use of torture. One must also assume that he has issued a later directive which expanded the use of torture beyond Guantanamo.

6) Haynes notes in his report:

Page 71 "Should the use of more aggressive interrogation techniques than have been traditionally used by U.S. forces become public, it is likely to be exaggerated or distorted in the U.S. and international media accounts, and may produce an adverse effect on support for the war on terrorism."

It seems clear, that the administration did NOT want any of this becoming public. They are still attempting to localize the problem to a "few bad apples" even though it is clear that knowledge of the "abuse" was approved at least to Rumsfeld. So the question is, How can they be trying soldiers for abuse when the responsibility clearly lies above them? The pivotal question is, were they following a policy? That policy is starting to emerge, but is far from clear at this point.

Conclusion

What the documents point to, is that 1) it is the policy to this administration to utilize interrogation ("counter resistance") techniques that are outside of the Geneva Convention and the Torture Conventions, outside US law, and strongly counter to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Unless, a number of units had "gone rogue," there should be documentation on every individual who was held and interrogated under Category II or beyond techniques (this was clearly requested by Rumsfeld). If there is not documentation, was there another policy change that changed who had to know and approve? In other words, we could assume that the policy became "anything goes."

Rumsfeld, and Myers were both "in the loop," and information was being presented to the President as well. This means that knowledge of what the actual policy was (and is), and approval of it, came from the highest levels. Denial of knowledge, or arguing that "we don't approve torture" are outright lies. Therefore, they have lied to the people of the U.S., to the Congress, and they have refused to provide documents Congressional oversight committees. I believe that the last two at least are illegal if not impeachable.



Notes on the Documents
Document 3:  Memo for Commander Joint Task Force 170, Dated: 11 October 2002   DoD Doc 3

Page 3
Category I techniques are for interrogation in a comfortable environment with the offering of "rewards" ("cookies or cigarettes).

Category II techniques allow yelling at the prisoner; deception; multiple interrogators; claiming that the interrogator is a civilian from a foreign nation. With permission of GIC, interrogators can us "stress positions" for a maximum of four hours; use falsified documents or reports; place in isolation for up to 30 days with approval, and extended beyond 30 days with the approval of the Commanding General.

Page 4
Interrogation may take place somewhere besides the interrogation booth. Light and sound sensory deprivation; hooded during transportation and questioning; 20 hour interrogations; removal of all comfort items; feeding only MREs (meals ready to eat); stripping the prisoner; forced grooming; "use of detainee's phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress"

Category III techniques
Requires request through the Director of JIG (?)and approval of Commanding General with legal review.

"Any of these techniques that require more than light grabbing, poking, or pushing, will be administered only by individuals specifically trained in their safe application."

Threats of death or severe pain to detainee or his family.

exposure ot cold weather or water

use of wet towels to "induce the misperception of suffocation"

use of "mild" physical contact (note unless more significant pain is approved)

Several pages of legal analysis are included with the conclusion that the techniques authorized for interrogations are legal (page 10). More extreme techniques are considered legal "so long as there is an important governmental objective."

Document 4:  SOUTHCOM’s endorsement of the CJTF-170’s request, Dated: 25 October 2002   DoD Doc 4

James T Hill, General US Army, approves Category I and II techniques, but has reservations about Category III techniques

Document 5:  Secretary of Defense memorandum ref: approving counter resistance techniques, Dated: 02 December 2002   DoD Doc 5 12/2/02

William J Haynes, General Counsel, ran the suggested interrogation strategies past Deputy Doug Feith and General Myers. He claims that there are no issues with Category I and II techniques, but that except for standing for a maximum of 4 hours Category III techniques are a matter of policy.

Rumsfeld writes on the bottom of the memo "Howard, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?"

Document 6:  Secretary of Defense memorandum for Commander, SOUTHCOM ref: Counter Resistance Techniques Dataed:15 Jan 2003  DoD Doc 6

From Rumsfeld tasking the General Counsel to establish aworking group to determine legality and impacts of various interrogation methods. (1/15/03)

Document 7:  Memorandum for the Department of Defense General Counsel Ref: Detain interrogations Dated:15 Jan 2003    DoD Doc 7 1/15/03 Rumsfeld suspends approval of anything beyond Category I techniques until the working group reports.

Document 8:  Working Group Report ion detainee operations Dated:04 April 2003   DoD Doc 8

The actual report is dated 4/03/03

page 5 "Many of the techniques of the second and third type have been requested by USSOUTHCOM and USCENTCOM."

page 5 Seems to read the President's policy as using techniques that violate the Geneva Convention (paragraph 2)

The bulk of the report details various aspects of international and US law, and then discusses how defense might be made against any charges.

Conclusions - page 69
- Detainees are not covered by the Geneva Convention ans therefore are beyond the definition of POW

- US law doesn't apply if detainees are not US citizens or are held outside the territory of the US

Page 71 "Should the use of more aggressive interrogation techniques than have been traditionally used by U.S. forces become public, it is likely to be exaggerated or distorted in the U.S. and international media accounts, and may produce an adverse effect on support for the war on terrorism."

Page 72 "As the Comander in Chief authority is vested in the President, we recommend that any exercise of authority by DOD personnel be confirmed in writing through Presidential directive or other document."

Document 9:  Memo for Commander, SOUTHCOM: Counter Resistance Technique in the War on Terrorism Dated:16 Apr 2003  DoD Doc 9 4/16/03

Rumsfeld approved techniques "A-X set out at tab A" of his response. He also requires that use of techniques "B,I, O or X" he must be notified in advance.

"B" Incentive/Removal of Incentive. Concern is over religious items.

"I" Pride and Ego Down - cautions about degrading detainees

"O" Mutt and Jeff could run into Geneva Convention issues

"X" Isolation - going beyond international agreements

If interrogators wish to go beyond these measures "... you should provide me, via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written request describing the proposed technique, recommended safeguards, and the rationale for applying it with an identified detainee."