Afghanistan - not a "pipe dream" any longer
By: S. Rowan Wolf, Ph.D., Uncommon Thought Journal
June 27, 2004 This work is under a fair use Creative Commons License
It is so easy to forget that there is a long term history of energy interests in Afghanistan. Part of the reason is the ongoing promotion of the invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban as a "just war". This is convenient because officialdom and their media lackeys can rightly claim "There is no oil in Afghanistan." True ... and not true. While Afghanistan has little oil, it is getting a long in the making oil pipeline.
Philip Thorton goes to the heart of the issue with his June 26, 2004 Independent article Hidden costs of pipeline meant to safeguard West's oil supply. There has been a long term plan to get the gas and oil reserves out of Russia and into the global market. Starting in 1996, a consortium evolved, which ultimately became the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. This is a group of massive oil companies (including Unocal, TexacoChevron, and BP) working with state owned energy companies (Russia, Oman, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere).
After the investment of billions of dollars, the pipeline had effectively stalled in between 1998 and 2000. As I noted in the article Power Play?:
The Clinton administration had been working with the Taliban from 1994 forward. Why? Because some companies (particularly UNOCAL and Saudi owned Delta) wanted "to build a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan." ... "so that the vast untapped oil and gas reserves in the Central Asian and Caspian region could be transported to markets in South Asia, South-East Asia, Far East and the Pacific" ( How America Courted the Taliban). This is supported by Jon Flanders 2001 article. While official relations were purportedly broken off in 1998, relations with the Taliban were maintained through the State Department (Ahmad) and through the Pakistan Military Intelligence ISI by the CIA (Chossudovsky).
According to Jon Flanders (2001), U.S. interest in the pipeline restarted in 2000, but was still not moving forward when Bush was elected. With Bush came Cheney (CEO of Halliburton) and Halliburton had investments in Turkmentistan for "integrated drilling services with an estimated value of $30 million for the total package."
It should not be surprising given the oil interests of the President, his kin, and his appointees, that Bush placed Afghanistan on the top of his action list. In July 2001, Colin Powell gave the Taliban $43 million for "humanitarian aid" (Madsen, 2002).
With billions of dollars already sunk into the investment, and yet another large cache of oil and gas reserves hanging in the balance, George W. Bush was decreed President. Afghanistan, and the pipeline, were clearly at the top of his agenda, and 9/11 provided a public justification to oust the Taliban and take more direct control of the situation. It is a move that obviously paid off. The success was signaled by two releases from the White House: the first on 11/13/2001 Caspian Pipeline Consortium Fact Sheet (full copy below); followed by a congratulatory statement on November 28, 2001 (copy below).
The US Department of Energy provides some interesting information in its Afghanistan Fact Sheet (6/04). First is that Hamid Karzai (former Unocal adviser in Afghanistan and now interim President) heads a "transnational administration." Unfortunately, they do not illuminate what nations are involved. Their historical overview of Afghan energy is interesting in light of US involvement in Afghanistan from the 1980s (under Reagan) onward.
Between the 1960s and mid-1980s, the Soviets had identified more than 15 oil and gas fields in northern Afghanistan. Only three gas fields -- Khwaja Gogerdak, Djarquduk, and Yatimtaq – were developed in the area surrounding Sheberghan, which is located about 120 kilometers west of Mazar-i-Sharif. Afghan natural gas production reached 275 million cubic feet per day (Mmcf/d) in the mid-1970s. The Djarquduk field was brought online during that period and boosted Afghan natural gas output to a peak of 385 Mmcf/d by 1978. About 100 mmcf/d of this amount was used locally in gas distribution systems in Sheberghan and Mazar-i-Sharif as well as at a 100,000 mt/y urea plant located near Mazar-i-Sharif. One oil field, Angot, was developed in the late 1960s, but aside from production tests, oil production was intermittent, with daily outputs averaging 500 b/d or less.
Northern Afghanistan has proved, probable and possible natural gas reserves of about 5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). This area, which is a southward extension of the highly prolific, natural gas-prone Amu Darya Basin, has the potential to hold a sizable undiscovered gas resource base, especially in sedimentary layers deeper than what were developed during the Soviet era. Afghanistan’s crude oil potential is more modest, with perhaps up to 100 million barrels of medium-gravity recoverable from Angot and other fields that are undeveloped. Afghanistan also may possess relatively small volumes of gas liquids and condensate.
By the 1970s, "Afghanistan supplied 70%-90% of its natural gas output to the Soviet Union's natural gas grid via a link through Uzbekistan." Further, Afghanistan "is estimated to have 73 million tons of coal reserves." Noting the strategic placement of Afghanistan as the preferred route for a pipeline, they then, move into the realm of disinformation by stating (emphases mine):
Given the obstacles to development of a natural gas pipeline across Afghanistan, it seems unlikely that such an idea will make any progress in the near future, and no major Western companies have expressed interest in reviving the project. The security situation in Afghanistan remains an obvious problem, while tensions between India and Pakistan make it unlikely that such a pipeline could be extended into India and its large (and growing) gas market. Financial problems in the utility sector in India, which would be the major consumer of the natural gas, also could pose a problem for construction of the TAP line. Finally, the pipeline's $2.5-$3.5 billion estimated cost poses a significant obstacle to its construction.
Numerous sources make clear that the Caspian Pipeline Consortium is alive and well - even battling environmental groups as noted by Thorton. In fact, the CPC just held their annual general meeting on March 27, 2004. There is no indication in that press release that they are on the verge of calling it quits.
The "good war" of Afghanistan based on "getting" Osama bin Laden and eradicating al Qaeda, joins the "good war" of Iraq to "liberate" the Iraqi people from the cruel grips of Saddam Hussein. With the looming transition of power to occur on June 30th, one has to wonder if Iraq will join Afghanistan in having a "transnational administration." One has to ask what a "democracy" looks like under "transnational" governments. In Afghanistan, the top two men are both former Unocal advisers. In Iraq, at least in the short term, the top men are known CIA assets. Does this mean that the US expects more trouble in Iraq than Afghanistan? Is Iraq not yet ready for corporate rule, and therefore must be guided to the process under the invisible expertise of the CIA? Is the escalating violence in Iraq in any way tied to an understanding of these events?
Afghanistan is coming up on its first elections in September- also among increasing violence (Taliban Targeting Would-Be Afghan Voters, Annan calls on NATO to send more troops to Afghanistan as promised). The Afghan elections have been delayed ... and delayed again. It seems that at each critical juncture in Afghanistan, the US has pulled troops and resources into Iraq. One has to ask whether the instability, and the delay of elections, serve a larger purpose - such as not wanting Karzai and crew out of control yet. Will that pattern be replicated in Iraq as the time nears for the interim government to turn over power to an elected Iraqi government? If so, will it be due to ongoing "insurgent" activity in Iraq, or will another "regime change" elsewhere provide the necessary distraction?
Some may think this a bit paranoid, but how much have you heard about the largest "legitimate" economic venture in Afghanistan?
Sources and Resources
Timeline of Competition Between Unocal and Bridas for the Afghanistan Pipeline, World Press Review.
A Timeline of Oil and Violence - Afghanistan, Ring Nebula
Afghan pipeline given go-ahead, BBC, 5/30/02
Afghanistan Fact Sheet US Dept. of Energy, last update 6/04.
Kazakhstan: Major Oil and Natural Gas Projects, Dept. of Energy, July, 2002
European Bank Natural Resources- signed projects (1993-2002)
Afghanistan plans gas pipeline, BBC, 5/13/02
Central Asia pipeline deal signed, McWilliam, BBC, 12/27/02
Afghan pipeline given go-ahead, BBC, 5/30/02.
Power Play?, UTJ, Wolf, 3/23/04 republished from 5/02
The Empire Frame of Mind
Ex-official’s book explores American Taliban, East Valley Tribune, Webb, 6/24/04.
Caspian Pipeline Opens, Washington Times, Pala, 12/03/2001
The Caspian Pipeline Consortium Project, Pipeline & Gas Journal/February 2001/www.undergroundinfo.com.
PBN Case Studies: Caspian Pipleine Consortium
You Can't Call This Pipeline A Pipedream Now, Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies, Socor, 3/17/2001. (Discusses Israeli interests in the pipeline)
Speech by Ian MacDonald, General Director of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium International Energy Agency Round Table on Caspian Oil & Gas Scenarios - Florence, 14th April, 2003
CASPIAN PIPELINE CONSORTIUM STUDY RECEIVES KAZAKH GOVERNMENT APPROVAL; RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT APPROVAL ANTICIPATED, ChevronTexaco Press Release 11/02/1998
The CPC was founded in 1992. Equity interest is: Russia, 24 percent; Kazakhstan, 19 percent; Oman, 7 percent; Chevron, 15 percent; LUKARCO, 12.5 percent; Rosneft-Shell, 7.5 percent; Mobil, 7.5 percent; Agip, 2 percent; British Gas, 2 percent; Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures, 1.75 percent; Oryx, 1.75 percent.
Caspian Pipeline Consortium raises fees for oil transportation, Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections, 4/07/2004
The major shareholders in the consortium include Russia (24 % of the shares), Kazakhstan (19 %) and Oman (7 %).
The main private shareholders are Chevron Caspian Pipeline Consortium (15 %) and LUKArco (12.5 %).
Caspian Pipeline Consortium Fact Sheet 11/13/2001
Caspian Pipeline Consortium
While in Russia in October of this year, U.S. Commerce Secretary Don Evans joined government and business leaders to welcome the announcement that the first tanker loaded with oil from the Caspian Pipeline Consortium departed the port of Novorossiysk. "It tells the world that the United States, Russia, and Central Asian states are cooperating to build prosperity and stability in this part of the world," Evans said.
The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) is a $2.6 billion project consisting of a 935-mile crude oil pipeline that runs from the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Construction on the CPC pipeline began in 1999. It is a key East-West pipeline that will carry oil from the Caspian Sea region to international markets.
The CPC project is the largest, single United States investment in Russia. U.S. companies, including ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil, have contributed nearly one-half of the $2.6 billion investment.
Initial capacity of the pipeline will be over 500,000 barrels per day, and is expected to reach to about 1.4 million barrels per day by 2015.
The CPC project advances the Administration's National Energy Policy by diversifying our States energy supply (thereby enhancing our energy security) and by supporting global economic growth. It also highlights the Caspian-region countries' progress towards establishing a transparent and stable environment for international trade and investment.
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President's Statement on Caspian Pipeline Consortium , 11/28/01
Statement by the President
I congratulate Russia, Kazakhstan, and Oman, and their consortium partners, for the commissioning of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). U.S. firms, notably ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil, have played leading roles in this project. These facilities represent the culmination of years of effort. They are examples to the world that the United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan are cooperating to build prosperity and stability in this part of the world.
The CPC highlights the important progress by countries in the Caspian region in building a transparent and stable environment for international trade and investment. The CPC project also advances my Administrations National Energy Policy by developing a network of multiple Caspian pipelines that also includes the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Supsa, and Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipelines and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. These projects will help diversify U.S. energy supply and enhance our energy security, while supporting global economic growth.
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